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ELEMENT ANALYSIS APPLIED TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES: WHAT DID THEY KNOW 
AND WHEN DID THEY KNOW IT? 
}{ebecca S. VVebber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At one time, an analysis of the culpability required to convict a 
violator of an environmental protection statute would have been an 
academic exercise. The recent surge in the number of prosecutions 
of environmental crimes,l however, has made such an analysis es-
sential. The increasing volume of criminal cases will make criminal 
penalty provisions more controversial as defendants search for strat-
egies to challenge convictions. It is therefore critical to develop an 
analytical approach to the interpretation of such criminal provisions. 
Synthesizing the environmental criminal cases brought to date 
provides a rough guideline to the interpretation of criminal penalty 
provisions. 2 The culpability required for conviction, however, has 
proven to be as thorny an issue in these cases as it has always been 
with respect to common law crimes. 3 The fact that most environ-
* Editor in Chief, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 379, 383 
(1986); see also McMurry & Ramsey, Environmental Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions 
in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1133, 1141-43 (1986); Riesel, Crim-
inal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, [15 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10065, 10066 (March 1985); Wrenn, Important New Trends in the 
Prosecution of Environmental Crimes, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1025, 1025 (Feb. 18, 1987). 
2 See, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971); 
United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (1Ith Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson 
& Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
:l MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 5 (Tent. Draft No.4 1955) [hereinafter M.P.C. 
COMMENTS]; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5, at 216 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter 
LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW]; see generally R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 744-45 (2d 
ed. 1969); Robinson & Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model 
Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 705 (1983). 
53 
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mental statutes belong in the category of "public welfare" statutes 
further complicates the issue of culpability.4 This additional confusion 
results from courts applying a different set of standards to public 
welfare statutes than the already chaotic set of standards applied to 
crimes deriving from common law. 
This Comment discusses culpability elements in environmental 
criminal provisions in order to develop an approach to determine the 
culpability required for conviction. It focuses on "knowing" require-
ments because most environmental statutes impose criminal penal-
ties only when conduct is "knowing."5 This Comment first details 
the development of public welfare crimes and the case law inter-
preting that development. The cases chosen will illustrate the diffi-
culty courts have had developing a uniform approach to determining 
the culpability prescribed by environmental statutes with "knowing" 
elements. Synthesizing from this case law, the third section of this 
Comment will suggest a series of analytical guidelines to use in 
determining an environmental statute's culpability requirement. The 
approach utilizes element analysis, requiring a determination of the 
culpability required for each separate element of an offense. Finally, 
this Comment concludes that, although culpability analysis is likely 
to continue to be imprecise,6 use of the approach detailed in Section 
III will provide uniformity, more thorough analysis, and criminal 
penalties more closely tailored to violations of environmental stat-
utes. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE CRIMES AND 
CULPABILITY ANALYSIS 
A. Traditional Public Welfare Statutes 
The earliest criminal laws in America were adopted from English 
common law. 7 In codifying these common law crimes, states did not 
4 For definitions of public welfare statutes, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
255 (1951); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 432--33 (1985). 
5 Riesel, supra note 1, at 10067-70. 
For speculation as to why Congress began adding culpability requirements, see id. at 10067 
and see generally Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, Thoughts on the Role of Penalties in the Enforce-
ment of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 17 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 26--30 (1978-79). 
6 The issue of culpability has historically been a source of confusion and frustration. See 
Robinson & Grall, supra note 3, at 686-87, 705. Despite the refinement of culpability analysis 
provided by the Model Penal Code, the Model Penal Code has been challenged as "seriously 
flawed, if not entirely unworkable." Id. at 719. Given the continuing dispute over analytical 
methods, and the difficulty courts have determining culpability, culpability analysis is not 
likely to develop into a precise science in the near future. This Comment attempts to pave 
the way for that development. 
7 See LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 2.lCc). Criminal laws adopted from English 
. .., 
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always prescribe culpability as an element of the offense. 8 Because 
a culpable state of mind is a historic and universal component of 
criminal conduct, however, courts usually read such an element into 
these statutes. 9 
As social needs changed, lawmakers created new offenses in re-
sponse.1O These offenses had no origin in common law but were 
developed by both Congress and state legislatures to protect the 
public from rapidly expanding sources of danger and injury. For 
example, the Industrial Revolution accelerated the number of new 
regulations needed to protect public health, safety, and welfare. ll 
Lawmakers added criminal provisions in order to make the regula-
tions governing these offenses more effective, rather than to pun-
ish. 12 
Many of these criminal provisions did not prescribe culpability, 
imposing strict liability instead as a matter of policy. 13 Those regu-
latory crimes that imposed strict criminal liability were referred to 
as "public welfare offenses. "14 The Supreme Court distinguished 
these offenses as those in which: the defendant could have avoided 
the violation by exercising reasonable care; the penalties were "rel-
atively small"; and conviction would not cause serious harm to the 
defendant's reputation. 15 
When convicting defendants of public welfare offenses, federal 
courts emphasized the need to protect the larger good over the need 
to require criminal intent to protect individuals. 16 United States v. 
common law have been referred to as offenses malum in se. See generally id. § 1.6(b) (for a 
comparison of crimes malum in se and crimes malum prohibitum). 
8 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251-52. 
"Culpability" is the term used in the Model Penal Code to refer to the range of state of 
mind requirements in criminal offenses. According to the Model Penal Code, culpability 
includes purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 
3, comment 2. If legislation contains a statement of a particular culpability requirement, or if 
the legislature has articulated in any way some kind of culpability, the legislature or law is 
said to have "prescribed" culpability. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962); M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 6. 
fj See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-52; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 
422, 437 (1977). 
10 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54; see also Sayre, Public We(fare Offenses, 33 COLUM. 
L. REV. 55 (1933) (development of public welfare offenses). 
II Morissette, 342 U.S. at 253-54. 
12Id. at 254-55; United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922); Developments in the 
Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 
HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (1979) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
13 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
14 See id. at 255-56; Olds, Unkovic, & Lewin, supra note 5, at 10. 
IG Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
16 See id. at 258-60. 
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Balint, in 1922, was one of the first Supreme Court cases to artic-
ulate this emphasis. 17 In allowing a conviction for narcotics posses-
sion despite no charge of criminal culpability, the Court focused on 
the need to protect public health at the risk of penalizing innocent 
persons. 18 The Court noted that, in contrast to the common law 
requirement of intent, a modified requirement was appropriate for 
certain statutes the purposes of which would otherwise be ob-
structed. 19 This distinction was crude because enforcement of every 
statute is "obstructed" by an intent requirement. The Balint deci-
sion, therefore, did not help explain why abandoning the traditional 
requirement of intent was appropriate. 20 
The Supreme Court did not provide a more helpful explanation 
until more than twenty years later in United States v. Dotterweich. 21 
As in Balint, the Court in Dotterweich allowed a conviction for 
shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs "though consciousness 
of wrongdoing be totally wanting. "22 The Court explicitly related the 
abandonment of an intent requirement to the "peculiar nature and 
quality of the offense. "23 As a result, a culpability requirement could 
be dispensed with when criminal penalties simply served to make a 
regulation more effective and when the person penalized stood "in 
responsible relation to a public danger. "24 
Both Balint and Dotterweich imposed pure strict criminal liability 
for violations of federal drug regulations, that is, strict liability with 
respect to all elements of the offense. 25 The Court relied on this 
acceptance of strict criminal liability in the 1971 case of United States 
v. Freed. 26 In Freed, the Court imposed a culpability requirement 
with respect to two elements of a National Firearms Act27 offense 
17 United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1922). 
I' I d. at 252. 
19Id. at 251-52. 
20 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259. 
21 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
~2 Id. at 284. 
2:< Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259. 
24 Dotter-weich, 320 U.S. at 28l. 
25 See Batey, Strict Construction of Firearms Offenses: The Supreme Court and the Gun 
Control Act 1968, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 176 & nn.114, 116 (1986). 
Strict liability is the general rule with respect to pure food and drug laws: 
[tlhe distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to 
human life and health, hence, a dangerous act, and cannot be made innocent and 
harmless by the want of knowledge or by the good faith of the seller; it is the act 
itself, not the intent, that determines the guilt, and the actual harm to the public is 
the same in one case as in the other. 
35 AM. JUR. 2D Food * 77 (1967). 
2t; 401 U.S. 601 (1971). 
27 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5872 (1982). 
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but imposed strict liability with respect to a third. 28 Consequently, 
the prosecution needed to prove that the defendant knew he pos-
sessed certain items and that those items were hand grenades, but 
not that he knew the grenades were unregistered. 29 The Court ra-
tionalized that the defendant need not know that the grenades were 
unregistered because the violation involved was as serious as the 
food and drug violations in Balint and Dotterweich. 30 
The Freed decision laid the groundwork for judicial interpretation 
of regulatory offenses that prescribed culpability as a requirement 
for criminal conviction. Although the act violated in Freed did not 
contain a culpability requirement, the act was unlike others previ-
ously classified as public welfare statutes because it imposed felony 
penalties rather than misdemeanor penalties. 31 Prior to Freed, public 
welfare offenses had been defined as regulatory offenses that did not 
specify intent, imposed relatively small penalties, and caused no 
grave damage to a defendant's reputation. 32 In Freed, however, the 
Court expanded the category of public welfare statutes to include 
statutes that imposed felony penalties,33 penalties that have histor-
ically not been regarded as relatively small. 34 
In recognition of this history, and the traditional requirement of 
culpability for the imposition of criminal penalties, Justice Brennan 
filed a concurring opinion in Freed in which he argued that element 
analysis was necessary.35 In his opinion, the level of culpability that 
must be proved for conviction could not be determined simply by 
"" Freed, 401 U.S. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
~" Freed, 401 U.S. 60l. 
:lO [d. at 609. 
31 The consequences of a felony conviction are much more severe than those of a misde-
meanor. See generally United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 439-41 (3d Cir. 1986) (Higgen-
botham, J., concurring), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1900 (1987). Compare Freed, 401 U.S. 601 
(National Firearms Act imposed imprisonment of up to five years) with United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act imposed imprison-
ment of up to one year). 
:1~ See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1951). 
33 See Freed, 401 U.S. at 609-10. 
:14 A felony conviction imposes a high penalty and seriously damages a person's reputation. 
See generally supra note 3l. 
:lG Freed, 401 U.S. at 610 (Brennan, J., concurring), cited with approval in Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985). 
In Freed, Brennan noted that the government's power to create strict liability crimes is 
limited to situations 
where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence 
thereto properly expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where 
conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken 
over from the common law, and where congressional purpose is supporting .... 
[d. at 613 n.4 (quoting Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960». 
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categorizing the statute violaterl as a "regulatory" statute. 36 Rather, 
the offense must be broken down into its material elements and the 
level of culpability required determined separately for each ele-
ment. 37 
According to Brennan's analytical approach, the determination of 
the culpability requirement for each element of an offense must be 
based on congressional intent as indicated by legislative history, 
congressional treatment of case law, constitutional considerations, 
and any common law background of the crime at issue. 38 Legislative 
history meant the history specifically dealing with the statute's culp-
ability element39 as well as history of the entire statute and the 
purposes that the statute was intended to effectuate. 4o Constitutional 
issues included the due process concern that persons be on notice 
that the activity they are engaged in is not likely to be innocent. 41 
Constitutional considerations might affect determination of the 
culpability requirement in one of two ways. A court may decide to 
infer such a requirement to ensure protection of due process rights. 
Alternatively, a court may presume culpability on the assumption 
31) Id. at 612-13. Brennan seems to suggest that the majority disagrees with him on this 
point. The majority is careful, however, to explain that the statute before it is not just a 
regulatory measure but is an act "premised on the theory that one would hardly be surprised 
to learn that possession of hand grenades is not an innocent act." Id. at 609. Brennan's 
treatment of the statute is not much different. Batey, supra note 25, at 177-78 (criticizing 
Brennan's concurrence in Freed). 
37 Freed, 401 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
As Brennan explained in Freed, mens rea 
Id. 
is not a unitary concept, but may vary as to each element of a crime . . . . To 
determine the mental element required for conviction, each material element of the 
offense must be examined and the determination made what level of intent Congress 
intended the Government to prove, taking into account constitutional considerations 
This element analysis approach is similar to the approaches taken by the Model Penal Code 
and by Robinson and Grall in their article on element analysis. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962); Robinson & Grall, supra note 3. Element analysis must be 
distinguished from offense analysis. Element analysis involves determining culpability for each 
element of an offense and the culpability may vary as to each element. See Robinson & Grall, 
supra note 3, at 687-88. In contrast, offense analysis involves only one state of mind require-
ment for an entire offense. Id. at 688. 
:l8 Freed, 401 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
39 See id. at 614. 
40 See id. at 616. 
41 See id.; see also United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 
564-65 (1971) ("Pencils, dental floss, paper clips ... may be the type of products which might 
raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require ... 'mens rea' as to each 
ingredient of the offense."); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 162 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) ("the general principle that awareness of what one is doing is a prerequisite for 
the infliction of punishment"). 
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that the regulated conduct involved an activity or material so likely 
to be regulated that notice was ensured. 42 Neither of these ap-
proaches to due process issues would be necessary if the criminal 
provisions satisfied the notice requirement by penalizing only "know-
ing" conduct. 
Brennnan's analysis used both approaches. He began by pointing 
out that the imposition of felony penalties in the statute at issue in 
Freed presented a due process issue. Due process concerns have 
historically limited strict liability crimes to those crimes that impose 
relatively small penalties and do not seriously injure the defendant's 
reputation. 43 According to Brennan, the due process problem could 
be avoided by inferring a culpability requirement for two of the 
elements of the offense and articulating reasons why knowledge of 
the third element could be presumed. 44 
In addition to arguing that culpability should be determined on an 
element by element basis, Brennan sought to distinguish himself 
further from the majority by suggesting that, under different cir-
cumstances, it might be appropriate to require proof that a defendant 
was aware of a fact involving some knowledge of the law. 45 He 
explained that requiring knowledge of a fact with a legal element 
would not allow ignorance of the law to be a defense. 46 While "the 
4" See Freed, 401 U.S. at 616 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Inte1"1wtional Minerals, 
402 U.S. at 564-65. 
4:1 Freed, 401 U.S. at 616 (citing Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 
1960)). 
44 See id. at 614-16. 
Presuming that the defendant had knowledge of the third element was proper here given 
the nature of the regulated material. See Note, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1392, 1410 (1986). In Brennan's words, because "the firearms covered by the Act are 
major weapons . . . ; deceptive weapons ... ; and major destructive devices . . . , the 
likelihood of governmental regulation of the distribution of such weapons is so great that 
anyone must be presumed to be aware of it." Freed, 401 U.S. at 616. 
45 Freed, 401 U.S. at 615. Justice Brennan's reasons for not requiring such proof in this 
case are not all that different from the reasons given by the majority. Batey, supra note 25, 
at 177. 
46 See Freed, 401 U.S. at 615. 
In discussing whether the prosecution should prove that the defendant knew of the unre-
gistered status of the grenades he possessed, Brennan remarked: 
It is true that such a requirement would involve knowledge of law, but it does not 
involve "consciousness of wrongdoing" in the sense of knowledge that one's actions 
were prohibited or illegal. Rather, the definition of the crime, as written by Congress, 
requires proof of circumstances that involve a legal element, namely whether the 
grenades were registered in accordance with federal law. The knowledge involved is 
solely knowledge of the circumstances that the law had defined as material to the 
offense. 
Id. Brennan would apply the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse only when a 
defendant was ignorant that conduct was "prohibited or illegal." 
60 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 16:53 
law" implies "'consciousness of wrongdoing' in the sense of knowl-
edge that one's actions were prohibited or illegal,"47 a fact with a 
legal element involves legal awareness but not awareness of wrong-
doing. According to Brennan's analysis, then, a fact with a legal 
element would not come within the scope of the principle that ig-
norance of the law is no defense. 
For example, in Freed, knowledge of the unregistered status of 
the grenades would require knowledge of law but not necessarily 
knowledge that the possession of such grenades was illegal. 48 Reg-
istration of grenades is an activity that would not exist but for the 
law requiring registration. Knowledge that grenades are registered 
therefore involves a legal element because recognition that an item 
is registered requires some familiarity with the law. 49 Brennan dis-
tinguished such familiarity with the law from knowledge that one's 
behavior is illegal. 50 
Having made this distinction, Brennan then concluded that re-
quiring knowledge that the grenades were unregistered would not 
implicate the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 51 Had 
the principle applied, requiring culpability would be inappropriate. 
Absent its application, however, the culpability required for the third 
element of the offense, the unregistered status of the grenades, 
would have to be determined solely on the basis of congressional 
intent. 52 In summary, Brennan narrowed the application of the prin-
ciple that ignorance of the law is no defense by limiting the definition 
of knowledge of "the law" to knowledge of illegality. 
B. Growth of Environmental Protection Statutes and the 
Resulting Change in Culpability Analysis 
As the Supreme Court was deciding Freed, public welfare statutes 
were undergoing a transformation. In the 1970s, Congress enacted 
a series of environmental protection statutes that included culpabil-
ity requirements in their criminal provisions. 53 These statutes shared 
47Id. 
48Id. at 614-15. 
49 I d. at 615. 
50 Id.; see also supra note 46. 
51 See Freed, 401 U.S. at 615-16. 
52Id. at 616. 
53 Riesel, supra note 1, at 10067. These environmental protection statutes included the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982) ("know-
ingly"); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1982) ("knowingly or 
willfully"); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(dl-{e) (1982 
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the public health and safety concerns of the earlier public welfare 
statutes. They differed from earlier public welfare statutes, how-
ever, because, rather than imposing strict liability, they imposed 
criminal penalties only when conduct was culpable. 54 The addition of 
a culpability element reflected the common law concern for not cri-
minalizing innocent conduct. 55 As a result, public welfare statutes 
now included a class of offenses that carried criminal penalties only 
when conduct was "knowing."56 
Most environmental crimes fit into this relatively new class of 
public welfare offenses. 67 Courts interpreting the culpability re-
quired for conviction of these crimes must balance two opposing 
forces. On the one hand, the "knowing" requirements reflect common 
law tradition and due process concerns that criminal sanctions be 
imposed only when conduct is motivated by evil intent. 58 On the 
other hand, the public welfare character of these offenses justifies 
conviction no matter what the intent of the defendant for the sake 
of public health, safety, and welfare. 59 The balancing process may 
require a court to reconcile the strict interpretation of a "knowing" 
requirement with the public welfare character of the statute. 60 The 
& Supp. III 1985) ("knowingly"); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1H2) (1982) 
("knowingly") . 
. YI Compare Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951) (statute contained no culpability 
requirement but omission not construed as eliminating need for intent) and Freed, 401 U.S. 
601 (statute prescribed no culpability but imposition of felony penalty required Court to infer 
a culpability element) with United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 
558 (1971) (statute required that accused "knowingly violate" act to receive criminal penalty). 
,'5 R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 785 n.11; cf. id. at 948 ("The wish to insure against the 
harsh interpretation reached by some courts has no doubt been responsible for the inclusion 
of certain special provisions in the bigamy statutes, such as the word 'knowingly' .... "). 
56 See, e.g., supra note 53. 
57 See McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 1151; Riesel, supra note 1, at 10067-70. 
,'" R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 785 n.l1. See generally LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 3, § 2.12(cHd). 
5" See McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 1151. "In contrast to most criminal statutes, 
the standard of criminal environmental liability is less stringent, reflecting the legislative 
concern for protecting the important public interest in environmental safety. Accordingly, 
they could be liberally read to impose criminal liability without any requirement of intent." 
Id. 
No requirement of intent, however, is not the same as no requirement of culpability. Intent, 
distinguished by LaFave and Scott as "purpose," is merely one type of culpability. See LAFAVE 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 3.5, at 216. Culpability is the word used by the Model Penal 
Code to describe all types of states of mind. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)-(2) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962). Purpose is only one of the four categories of mental states that comprise 
culpability-purposely, knowingly, recklessly, negligently. Id. Thus, a statement that no intent 
is required does not mean that knowledge, recklessness, or negligence are not required. 
60 For example, the court in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985), had to reconcile the '''knowing violation' requirement 
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specific language of environmental statutes and their public policy 
aims thus combine to produce a hybrid standard regarding culpabil-
ity.61 
The Supreme Court's 1971 decision in United States v. Interna-
tional Minerals & Chemical COrp.62 provides one of the best ex-
amples of the difficulty courts have had developing this hybrid stan-
dard.63 In International Minerals, a shipper transported corrosive 
liquids in violation of regulations requiring that interstate commerce 
shipping papers show the proper classification of the materials being 
shipped. 64 . 
Unlike the statutes in Balint65 and Freed,66 the statute in Inter-
national Minerals contained a culpability requirement. 67 The stat-
ute, the Transportation and Explosives Act, imposed criminal lia-
bility on whoever "knowingly violate[dJ" any regulation promulgated 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) pursuant to its 
power with respect to transportation of corrosive liquids. 68 Despite 
the explicit statutory language requiring knowledge that a regulation 
was being violated, however, the International Minerals Court ap-
plied the same approach it had used in Balint and Freed. 69 The Court 
required proof that the defendant knew that he was shipping ma-
terials and that those materials were dangerous but did not require 
proof that the defendant knew of the regulation involved. 70 
To reach this holding, the International Miner'als Court had to 
address the specific language of the statute. Read literally, the stat-
ute in International Minerals required proof that defendants knew 
that they were violating an ICC regulation, that is, knew that they 
with the public welfare character of RCRA." McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 1152. 
Thus, public welfare statutes should not be strictly construed if such a construction would 
defeat the legislative purpose. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 10, 
at 72 (1972) [hereinafter LAFAVE HANDBOOK] (citing N.Y.R.R. v. United States, 265 U.S. 
41 (1924) (statute promoting railroad safety) and United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th 
Cir. 1947) (statute promoting public health». 
61 McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 1152. 
62 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
6:l The court in United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp. uses International Minerals as an example 
of the difficulty the Court has had "with statutes in which Congress has created an offense of 
'knowingly violating a regulation.'" 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (lIth Cir. 1986). 
64 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559. 
65 See supra text accompanying notes 17-20. 
66 See supra text accompanying notes 26-52. 
67 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559. 
6b Id. 
69 See id. at 565. 
7°Id. 
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were breaking the law. 71 The Court noted that it had rejected the 
literal interpretation of the "knowingly violates" language in an ear-
lier case by holding that knowledge of the regulation involved was 
not required. 72 The culpability required by the Court in this earlier 
case was simply knowledge of the actions regulated, not knowledge 
that these actions violated any law. 73 
The Court also refused to read the statute literally because re-
quiring proof that defendants knew they were violating a regulation 
would conflict with the general rule of law that ignorance of the law 
is no defense. 74 Only ignorance of "facts," as opposed to "the law," 
would avoid such a conflict. Acknowledging that the legislative his-
tory clearly expressed Congress' desire not to impose strict or ab-
solute liability, the International Minerals majority refused to at-
tribute more to Congress than a rejection of such liability. 75 
Congress' failure to amend the statute despite its awareness of 
courts that had read the "knowingly violates" language literally did 
not satisfy the International Minerals Court that Congress' silence 
could be read as acceptance of the literal reading.76 The majority 
emphasized that a court may interpret a statute as abandoning a 
general rule of law only if Congress has clearly endorsed such an 
interpretation. 77 Congressional silence and congressional reluctance 
to impose strict or absolute liability does not constitute a sufficient 
endorsement. As a result, the Court refused to read the "knowingly 
violates" language literally. 78 
Having rejected a literal reading of the ICC regulation, the Court 
interpreted "knowingly violates" as a "shorthand designation" for 
knowingly engaging in any of the acts or omissions prohibited by 
the ICC regulations. 79 The Court thus began its culpability analysis 
71 See id. at 562-63. As Justice Stewart argued in dissent, "[olther federal courts, faced 
with the precise issue here presented, have held that the statute means exactly what it says-
that the words 'knowingly violates any such regulation' mean no more and no less than 
'knowingly violates any such regulation.'" Id. at 566 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 560-62 (discussing Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952». 
73 See id. at 561-62. 
71 Id. at 563. 
75Id. 
76 See id. at 562-63. 
77 See id. at 563. 
·78 See id. at 562-63. 
79 Id. at 562. As explained by the Court in Liparota v. United States: 
Section 2024(b)(1) is an identical statute, except that, instead of detailing the 
various legal requirements, it incorporates them by proscribing use of coupons 'in 
any manner not authorized' by law. This shorthand approach to drafting does not 
transform knowledge of illegality into an element of the crime. As written, 
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by substituting "violates any such regulation" with the words de-
scribing the prohibited behavior. In International Minerals, admin-
istrative regulations issued by the ICC described the prohibited 
behavior while the statute imposed the criminal penalties for such 
behavior.80 These regulations required shippers to describe on the 
shipping papers, by the shipping name and classification prescribed, 
any regulated material offered for transportation. 81 
As a result of the Court's substitution, the Court held that criminal 
penalties were appropriate whenever a shipper knowingly failed to 
provide the proper shipping papers for any regulated material of-
fered for transportation. il2 The Court identified three material ele-
ments comprising the offense at issue: the shipment of a material, 
the dangerous nature of the material, and the existence of the reg-
ulations requiring certain paperwork for shipment of corrosive liq-
uids. 83 The Court did not discuss whether the violator had to know 
that the shipping papers existed and were filled out as required by 
law. 
The International Minerals Court next had to determine whether 
the prescribed culpability applied to all material elements of the 
offense. R4 The determination depended on how many elements of the 
described offense the word "knowingly" modified. 85 Because the sta-
§ 2024(b)(l) is substantively no different than if it had been broken down into a 
collection of specific provisions making crimes of particular improper uses. 
471 U.S. 419, 436 (l985) (White, ,J., dissenting). 
"0 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559. 
" Id. 
Interpreting "knowingly violates any such regulation" as a shorthand designation suggests 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations should be read in the same way 
as statutes that use the longhand version. For example, RCRA uses the longhand version by 
punishing anyone who "knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste 
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this 
sUbchapter .... " 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l) (Supp. III 1985). 
"2 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65. 
1<1 See id. at 560. The Court did not reach the issue of Brennan's distinction in Freed between 
knowledge of facts with legal elements and knowledge of the law. 
'" Linguistic determinations are a necessary component of statutory interpretation. See, 
e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (lIth Cir. 1!J86); United States 
v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 460 U.S. 1081 (1983). For example, 
as the Marvin court commented, "[t]o read 'knowingly' as having nothing to do with the 
phrase 'in any manner not authorized' is ... verbally tenable, but it is not the only meaning 
the words will bear, nor even ... the more natural one." Marvin, 687 F.2d at 1226. 
"S This modification problem is best illustrated by an example cited by the Court in Liparota 
v. United States: 
Still further difficulty arises from the ambiguity which frequently exists concerning 
what the words or phrases in question modify. What, for instance, does 'knowingly' 
modify in a sentence from a 'blue sky' law criminal statute punishing one who 
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tutory language was ambiguous as to which material elements the 
"knowing" requirement applied, the Court based its determination 
on the same public policy grounds used to interpret public welfare 
statutes in the past. R6 Focusing on the need to protect public health 
and safety, the Court held that the prosecution need only prove 
knowledge of the first two material elements of the offense, that is, 
that the accused knew that he was shipping materials and that those 
materials were dangerous. 117 Because of the dangerousness of the 
materials involved, the Court held that the "knowing" requirement 
did not apply to the third element and that knowledge of the third 
element could be presumed. 88 As a result, the prosecution did not 
have to prove that the accused was aware of the ICC regulation. 
After International Minerals, judicial interpretation of the culp-
ability prescribed by public welfare offenses took several different 
directions. The responses to International Minerals varied because 
some courts did not follow the International Minerals analysis care-
fully or faithfully.89 Responses also varied because courts, interpret-
ing different statutes, faced statutory language and legislative his-
tory not discussed in International Minerals. 90 
In 1978, a California district court in United States v. Corbin Farm 
Service91 interpreted the criminal provisions of the Federal Insecti-
'knowingly sells a security without a permit' from the securities commissioner? To 
be guilty must the seller of a security without a permit know only that what he is 
doing constitutes a sale, or must he also know that the thing he sells is a security, 
or must he also know that he has no permit to sell the security he sells? As a matter 
of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear how far down the sentence 
the word 'knowingly' is intended to travel-whether it modifies 'sells,' or 'sells a 
security,' or 'sells a security without a permit.' 
471 U.S. 419, 424 n.7 (1985) (citing LAFAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 27, at 193). 
H6 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65. 
"' See id. Had the Court only required knowledge that any material was being transported, 
persons honestly believing they were transporting distilled water would be liable. See id. at 
563-64. Such liability might raise due process concerns. Id. at 564-65. As a result, the decision 
to modify two elements rather than just one represents a balance between individual due 
process rights and protection of public health and safety. 
&l Id. When "dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are 
involved, the probablity of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in 
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." 
Id. at 565. 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Elshenawy, 801 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1986) (presumed knowledge 
despite fact that regulated materials were not dangerous or deleterious); United States v. 
Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(presumed that all regulatory statutes have same culpability standard). 
90 See, e.g., United States V. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (RCRA); 
United States V. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1208 (1985) (RCRA). 
91 444 F. Supp. 510. 
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cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).92 The defendants in 
Corbin had allegedly applied a pesticide in a manner inconsistent 
with the pesticide's labeling.93 Such application is unlawful conduct 
pursuant to section 136j of FIFRA and is subject to criminal pen-
alties under section 136l(b) if defendants "knowingly violate[d]" sec-
tion 136j. 94 
The Corbin court is the only court to have interpreted the "know-
ingly violates" language in FIFRA's criminal penalty provisions. 95 
As a result, the court analogized to cases interpreting other regu-
latory statutes. 96 Noting that the standard of criminal liability is less 
stringent in regulatory statutes out of concern for public health and 
the environment, the Corbin court assumed that all regulatory stat-
utes have the same culpability requirement. 97 The court ignored the 
different culpability requirements imposed in the cases cited in sup-
port of this assumption. 98 In addition, the Corbin court did not 
acknowledge that different regulatory statutes impose different pen-
alties and contain different culpability language and that these dif-
ferences determine what culpability requirement is appropriate. 
In analogizing to other cases, the Corbin court relied most heavily 
on International Minerals because FIFRA contained the same 
"knowingly violates" language as that used in the ICC regulations. 99 
Like the International Minerals Court, the Corbin court looked first 
at the specific language in FIFRA and determined that the "know-
ingly violates" culpability standard should not be read literally.10o In 
92 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1982). 
93 Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 514-15. 
94 7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(a)(2)(G), 1361(b) (1982). 
95 See Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 519 (no relevant case law exists construing this particular 
statute). 
9il See id. at 519 & n.1. 
97 See id. at 519-20. 
All regulatory statutes, however, do not have the same culpability requirement. Greenspun, 
Criminal Intent Requirements and Defenses in Regulatory Prosecutions, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 
293, 297-98 (July-Aug. 1982) (note differences between statutes sanctioning only knowing 
conduct and statutes imposing strict liability). Determining that a statute is a regulatory 
statute does not help decide what level of culpability is appropriate. United States v. Freed, 
401 U.S. 601, 612-13 (1971). 
98 In contrast to FIFRA, the statutes in Dotterweich and Freed contained no culpability 
requirements. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (strict criminal liability); 
Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (knowledge of two elements required; presumption of knowledge, not 
strict liability, with respect to a third element). 
99 Compare 7 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1982) (any person "who knowingly violates any provision 
... shall be guilty") with 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1979) (whoever "knowingly violates any such 
regulation" shall be fined or imprisioned), repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-129, § 216(b), 93 Stat. 
1015 (1979). 
100 See Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 519. 
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contrast to the International Minerals Court, however, the Corbin 
court rejected a literal reading without analyzing the legislative 
history to ensure that Congress did not endorse such an interpre-
tation. 101 
The Corbin court next had to decide what material elements of 
the offense were modified by "knowingly violates." The Corbin 
court's assumption that all regulatory statutes have the same culp-
ability requirements led the court to apply the same culpability 
requirement imposed in International Minerals. 102 The court did not 
consider the distinction made in International Minerals between 
statutes regulating "dangerous or deleterious . . . materials" (public 
welfare statutes) and those regulating more harmless products (non-
public welfare statutes).103 In doing so, the court avoided having to 
determine whether pesticides were sufficiently dangerous or dele-
terious to justify a culpability requirement appropriate to public 
welfare statutes. 104 
In addition to assuming that FIFRA was a public welfare statute, 
the Corbin court did not analyze what culpability requirement would 
best serve the aims of FIFRA intended by Congress. Consequently, 
the regulatory purpose of FIFRA, as illustrated by legislative his-
tOl Compare id. (court's opinion omits any discussion of legislative history) with Interna-
tional Minerals, 402 U.S. at 562-63 (opinion includes detailed discussion of the House and 
Senate committee reports). 
102 See Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 519-20. 
This assumption actually contradicts International Minerals which indicated that, depend-
ing on the activity regulated, some statutes may require culpability as to every material 
element whereas, with others, knowledge may be presumed. International Minerals, 402 
U.S. at 564-65. 
10:1 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65. This distinction requires a court to 
determine whether pesticides are so "dangerous or deleterious ... [that] the probability of 
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them ... must be 
presumed to be aware of the regulation." Id. Absent such a determination, a court encounters 
due process problems if it applies a public welfare culpability standard to a statute that is in 
fact a non-public welfare statute. See id. 
104 In contrast to the materials regulated in International Minerals, pesticides do not clearly 
reach the level of dangerousness or deleteriousness that would justify a lower culpability 
requirement than the standard applied to non-public welfare statutes. Compare International 
Minerals, 402 U.S. 558 (lower culpability requirement applied to violation of corrosive liquids 
regulations) with Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (higher culpability require-
ment for violation of food stamp regulation because it was a non-public welfare statute). Unlike 
hazardous waste, pesticides are used on food products, intentionally released over thousands 
of acres of land in airborne spraying operations, sold over the counter, and applied in private 
homes across the country. See Feldman, Federal Pesticide Control Law: The Needfor Reform, 
[15 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10132, 10132 (May 1985). In drafting 
FIFRA and its amendments, Congress has emphasized the benefits and (apparent) necessity 
of pesticides. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3993,3995 [hereinafter SENATE FIFRA REPORT]. 
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tory, did not have an impact on what material elements of the offense 
were modified by "knowingly." The Corbin court did not consider 
whether the differences in legislative history between FIFRA and 
the ICC regulations in International Minerals should require two 
different culpability standards. 105 Noting that the International M in-
erals Court simply required proof that the defendants in that case 
knew they were transporting a dangerous liquid, the Corbin court 
only required proof that the defendants knew they were spraying a 
pesticide. 106 
In contrast, the Third Circuit in United States v. Johnson & 
Towers 107 reached a different result from International Minerals 
because different statutory language and legislative history required 
a greater level of culpability to justify criminal penalties. lOS In J ohn-
son & Towers, two employees of a chemical plant were indicted for 
violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).109 Section 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA prohibited knowing dis-
posal of hazardous waste without a permit. no Acquisition of a permit 
was governed by a separate provision of RCRA. Because only those 
persons who owned or operated a hazardous waste facility were 
105 Had the Corbin court looked at FIFRA's legislative history, it might have been less 
quick to impose criminal liability. Although FIFRA's legislative history noted that civil pen-
alties are a necessary part of a regulatory program, it does not make clear what types of 
conduct Congress wished to criminalize. See SENATE FIFRA REPORT, supra note 104, at 
4019. FIFRA lacks a clear regulatory purpose partly because of the difficulty in balancing 
society's need for pesticide use against the adverse health effects of pesticides. Lobbying 
power of agricultural and manufacturing groups also muddies the congressional intent behind 
FIFRA and has led to the imposition of a variety of economic protections for pesticide 
manufacturers. See Feldman, supra note 104, at 10132; Kaplan, The Food Chain Gang, 
COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 12; see, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 136m (indemnity 
for suspension of pesticide registrations), 1361(b)(3) (felony penalty for revealing pesticide 
formulas). Because these protections are a clear priority of FIFRA's criminal sanctions, it is 
difficult to read FIFRA as a statute whose purpose is to impose serious penalties on violators 
absent proof of knowledge regarding most or all material elements of an offense. 
106 See Corbin, 444 F. Supp. at 519-20. 
107 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
108 See supra text accompanying notes 89-90. 
109 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. 
RCRA provides criminal penalties for: 
[aJny person who -
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified 
or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit ... 
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this subchapter .... 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (Supp. III 1985) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1982)). Hereinafter, 
RCRA citations will be to the 1985 supplement unless otherwise indicated. 
110 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). 
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required to obtain permits, III the court first had to determine 
whether Section 6928(d)(2)(A) applied to employees. 1l2 
The court held that the defendant employees could be found crim-
inally liable pursuant to Section 6928(d)(2)(A).113 Like owners and 
operators, the employees must have known that they were disposing 
of a hazardous waste to be liableY4 Unlike owners and operators, 
employees must also have known that their company was required 
to obtain a disposal permit but did not in fact have one. 115 As a 
result, the prosecution had to show that the defendants knew that 
1) they were disposing materials; 2) those materials were hazardous 
wastes; 3) the facility for which they were disposing those wastes 
did not have a permit; and 4) the facility was required to have a 
permit. Knowledge of the third element in this case involved a legal 
element whereas knowledge of the fourth required the equivalent of 
knowledge of the statute. 
In reaching this holding, the Johnson & Towers court used a 
culpability analysis similar to the analysis used in International 
Minerals. The court looked first to the specific language of Section 
6928(d)(2)(A). As in International Minerals, the Johnson & Towers 
court decided that, at a minimum, the prosecution must prove knowl-
edge of the first two elements of the offense, that is, that the defen-
dants knew they were disposing of a material and that the material 
was hazardous. 116 As is common with penal legislation, the court 
found that the statutory language did not make clear whether the 
"knowingly" requirement modified only those two elements or mod-
ified the entire sentence describing the offense. 117 
111 Id. § 6925. 
112 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664. 
113 I d. at 664-65. 
114 Id. at 668. 
115Id. at 669. The court also said that employees can be criminally prosecuted only if they 
"knew or should have known that there had been no compliance with the permit requirement 
of section 6925." Id. at 665. This remark was unfortunate because it suggests a different 
culpability requirement than that requiring knowledge that a permit was required but did not 
in fact exist. In contrast to a "knowing" standard, "should have known" implies that all the 
prosecution must do is show negligence. Requiring only a showing of negligence when the 
statute requires "knowledge," however, is legislating on the part of the court. Moreover, 
negligence is not only an easier burden of proof but it is also considered to be a less appropriate 
standard for criminal penalties. M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 3, at 126-27. 
116 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. 
117 See id. at 668-69. "[AJ common ambiguity in penal legislation [is] the statement of a 
particular culpability requirement in the definition of an offense in such a way that it is unclear 
whether the requirement applies to all the elements of the offense or only to the element that 
it immediately introduces." M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 6. 
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In response to this ambiguity, the court first pointed out that the 
provision involved was part of a public welfare statute. llS RCRA 
qualified as a public welfare statute because, "in RCRA, no less than 
in the Food and Drugs Act, Congress endeavored to control hazards 
that, 'in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely be-
yond self-protection. "'119 This recognition guided the court's con-
struction of Section 6928(d)(2)(A) because, unlike common law offen-
ses, it is appropriate to read a public welfare statute as having no 
"mens rea requirement. "120 Such an interpretation is appropriate 
because public welfare statutes must be construed to effectuate their 
regulatory purpose. 121 
To determine the regulatory purpose of Section 6928(d)(2)(A) and 
RCRA, the Johnson & Towe1"s court looked at public policy justifi-
cations, congressional intent, and the syntax of Section 6928(d).122 
The court noted that, while policy concerns might justify imposing 
no mens rea requirement, the character of the statute at issue made 
such an interpretation "arbitrary and nonsensical. "123 In order to 
determine whether "knowingly" modified only the first two or all of 
the elements of the offense, then, the Johnson & Towers court 
balanced the public welfare character of RCRA against what Con-
gress might have intended. 124 
In performing this balancing test, the Johnson & Towers court 
noted several factors that weighed in favor of requiring a higher 
118 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. 
119Id. at 667 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943)). 
120 I d. at 668. 
In contrast to public welfare statutes, courts must presume a mens rea requirement for 
crimes originating in the common law. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 
438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960); see 
also R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 785. 
Note that mens rea is different from knowledge. Black's Law Dictionary defines mens rea 
as "[al guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
889 (5th ed. 1979). It defines knowledge as simply "[alcquaintance with fact or truth." Id. at 
784. As noted by the majority in Morissette v. United States, "[klnowledge, of course, is not 
identical with intent .... " 342 U.S. 246, 270 (1951); see also M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 
3, comment 3, at 124-25. Despite this distinction, the court in Johnson & Towers appears to 
use mens rea as meaning knowledge of the regulations' requirements. See Johnson & Towers, 
741 F.2d at 668-69 (the court states that it would be nonsensical not to require mens rea; 
thus, to avoid a nonsensical result, the court must have thought it was imposing a mens rea 
requirement by requiring knowledge of permit status and the regulations at issue). 
121 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666. 
122Id. at 668-69 .. 
123Id. at 668. It is not clear what the court's understanding of "mens rea" was. See supra 
note 120. That is, even if mens rea is not required, the court was not necessarily saying that 
the policies behind a public welfare statute justify imposing no culpability requirement. 
124 See McMurray & Ramsey, supra note 1, at 1152. 
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culpability standard than the minimum allowed for public welfare 
statutes. 125 The court considered fairness and statutory consis-
tency,126 the fact that the defendants were only employees,127 Con-
gress' concern about the hazards of toxic materials,128 and the diffi-
culty of the burden of proof on the government. 129 As a result of this 
weighing process, the court determined that "knowing" modified all 
elements of the offense, not just the first two. 130 Thus, the culpability 
requirement was not only higher for employees than for owners and 
operators but was also higher than the culpability requirement in 
International Minerals. 131 
Given the Supreme Court's insistence in International Minerals 
that a court should not require knowledge of the law absent a clear 
endorsement by Congress,132 this holding by the Third Circuit ap-
pears inconsistent. Though the Johnson & Towers court did not 
address this problem, it could have justified its holding by stating 
that it was only requiring knowledge of the regulations, not knowl-
edge of illegality. Citing Brennan in Freed and the Model Penal 
Code, it could have then argued that only ignorance of illegality is 
no excuse. 133 
This inconsistency probably stems from the Johnson & Towers 
court creating a higher culpability standard for employees than that 
prescribed by the statute for owners and operators.134 The court 
decided that the criminal provisions of the statute applied to em-
125 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69. 
The more elements of an offense "knowingly" modifies, the higher the culpability require-
ment (the greater the burden of proof for the prosecution). In the absence of a culpability 
requirement, some courts have imposed strict liability, thus imposing a lower requirement 
than those courts inferring a culpability requirement. For example, in the absence of a 
negligence requirement that clearly modified all elements of an offense, those courts inferring 
a recklessness standard for those elements not clearly modified would be imposing a higher 
culpability requirement than those courts reading the negligence requirement as modifying 
all elements of the offense. See Robinson & Grall, supra note 3, at 725 & nn.208-09. 
126 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69. 
127 See id. at 664-67. 
128Id. at 666-67. 
129 I d. at 669. 
130 See id. at 668-69. 
131 Compare id. (defendants must know that (1) they are disposing a material; (2) the material 
is hazardous; (3) their employer is required to have a permit for such disposal; and (4) their 
employer does not have such a permit) with United States v. International Minerals & Chern. 
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (defendants simply must know that (1) they are transporting a 
material; and (2) the material is dangerous). 
132 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971) (ignorance of the law is no defense). 
133 That is, the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies only when "the law" 
means "illegality." 
134 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65. 
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ployees, despite language limiting the provisions to "owners and 
operators. "135 As a result of reading the statute to include employees, 
the court felt the need to adjust the culpability element to provide 
more protections for employee defendants. By requiring knowledge 
that the facility did not have a permit but that a permit was required, 
the court would be less likely to convict innocent employees. 136 
C. Liparota v. United States: The Modern Definition of a Public 
Welfare Statute and the Appropriate Culpability 
A year after Johnson & Towers, the Supreme Court had an op-
portunity to clarify its position on the culpability required to impose 
criminal penalties pursuant to public welfare statutes. In the 1985 
case of Liparota v. United States, the federal government brought 
an action for food stamp fraud. 137 Although the action did not involve 
an environmental protection statute, the Liparota Court refined the 
definition of public welfare statutes and the culpability requirement 
appropriate for such statutes by distinguishing the food stamp reg-
ulations at issue from public welfare statutes. Because environmen-
tal protection laws usually qualify as public welfare statutes, the 
Liparota Court's holding affects environmental criminal culpability 
issues. 138 
In refining the definition of public welfare statutes, the Court 
distinguished mere regulatory statutes from those regulatory stat-
utes qualifying as public welfare statutes. 139 Without rejecting the 
Johnson & Towers holding that "regulatory statutes ... are to be 
construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose,"140 the Liparota 
Court emphasized that the purposes behind the Food Stamp Act 
were not compelling enough to justify dropping all culpability re-
quirements. 141 Absent public health and safety policy justifications 
characteristic of public welfare statutes, the Court found no rationale 
sufficient to overcome the historic requirement of mens rea for crim-
inal offenses,142 the principle that "ambiguity concerning the ambit 
135Id. 
136 The court was probably worried about due process. Because the statute seemed to cover 
only owners and operators, no employee would have been on notice that the law here also 
applied to them. Nevertheless, the court then ended up reading into the statute twice, not 
just once. 
137 471 U.S. 419, 421 (1985). 
138 See id. at 432-33. 
139Id. 
140 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666. 
141 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27. 
142 See id. at 425-26. 
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of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenitY,"148 and the 
reluctance to "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent con-
duct" without a clear message from Congress. 144 As a result, the 
culpability element in a non-public welfare statute should be read to 
modify all elements of the offense. 
In contrast, public welfare statutes regulate such serious threats 
to public health and safety that their related criminal offenses may 
properly "depend on no mental element but consist only of forbidden 
acts or omissions."145 Alternatively, as in International Minerals, 
the culpability element may be read as modifying only some of the 
elements of the offense. 146 Whether or not a statute is a public 
welfare statute thus has an impact on the culpability appropriate for 
criminal conviction. 
Given this impact, the Liparota Court created a two-part test to 
determine whether the statute before it qualified as a public welfare 
statute. 147 According to this test, a public welfare statute is one that 
"render[s] criminal a type of conduct that [1] a reasonable person 
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and [2] may 
seriously threaten the community's health or safety."148 The Court 
based the test on the analysis used in International Minerals. 149 
Employing this test, the Liparota Court held that the food stamp 
statute at issue did not qualify as a public welfare statute. 150 The 
Court noted that, unlike the activity in International Minerals, the 
possession of food stamps was an action the Court believed a person 
might be surprised to discover was not innocent. 151 Moreover, the 
fraudulent use of food stamps does not seriously threaten community 
health or safety.152 As a result, "knowingly" had to modify all ele-
143Id. at 427 (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). 
144 See id. at 426-27. 
145Id. at 432 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1951)). 
146 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971) 
(court required knowledge only of possession of dangerous materials but not of regulations). 
147 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33. 
148 I d. at 433. 
Note how the definition of public welfare statutes has changed since Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951). In Morissette, "[t]he Court defined 'public welfare offenses' as 
offenses against the authority of the state 'which impair [sic] the efficiency of controls deemed 
essential to the social order.'" S. ARKIN & J. WING, MENS REA, STATE OF MIND DEFENSES 
IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL FRAUD CASES 37 (1985) (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255-56). 
Liparota's two-part test, though a broad standard, limits the scope of the Morissette test. Id. 
at 39. Thus, fewer statutes may be read as imposing strict liability. 
149 Compare Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433 with International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65. 
150 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
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ments of the offense described in the food stamp regulation,153 thus 
requiring the prosecution to prove that "the defendant knew that 
his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in a manner unau-
thorized by statute or regulations."154 
Precisely what the Liparota Court meant by "unauthorized" is not 
clear. In most of its discussion, the Court referred only to the "knowl-
edge-of-illegality requirement" proposed by the defendants. 155 
Throughout its decision, the Court spoke approvingly of arguments 
supporting such a requirement. 156 Consequently, the Court may have 
been using the terms "illegal" and "unauthorized" interchangeably. 
The Liparota majority disputed the dissent's suggestion that the 
Court was creating an ignorance of the law defense through its use 
of "illegal" and "unauthorized. "157 In response to the dissent, the 
majority distinguished, in a footnote, between knowing that one's 
action is "illegal" and knowing that it is "unauthorized."158 In addi-
tion, the Court stated that the prosecution must prove that a defen-
dant knew his conduct was unauthorized but that the prosecution 
could provide such proof by showing that the defendant knew that 
his conduct was "unauthorized or illegal. "159 Thus, the Court prob-
ably intended to require that the defendant knew that his conduct 
was not authorized by the food stamp regulations, but not that he 
also knew that his conduct was illegal and subject to criminal pen-
alties. 160 In any case, the prosecution did not have to prove that the 
defendant had knowledge of the specific regulations involved. 161 
15:1 See United States v. Hayes Int'I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (llth Cir. 1986) ("In Liparota, 
... the Court held that 'knowingly' travelled all the way down the sentence."). 
154 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
155 See id. at 427-28 (rule of lenity supports petitioners' position). 
156 See, e.g., id. at 429, 430. 
157Id. at 425 n.9. 
]5H Id. 
It appears that the majority had not thought about the issue until raised by the dissent. 
The footnote seems to have been added as an afterthought. For example, despite the footnote's 
distinction between "unauthorized" and "illegal," the text of the opinion following the footnote 
comments that "the Government must prove knowledge of illegality." Id. at 427-28. Thus, 
the majority never went back and made the text consistent with its distinction between 
"unauthorized" and "illegal" in the footnote. Consequently, any suggestion by the Court that 
it wanted the prosecution to prove knowledge of illegality rather than knowledge of unau-
thorized conduct might be more inadvertent than intentional. 
159 Id. at 434 (emphasis added). 
160 The distinction between "authorized" and "illegal" echoes an argument made by Brennan 
in his concurrence in Freed and adopted in Liparota. See id. at 425 n.9. In Freed, Brennan 
remarked on the difference between facts with "legal elements" and knowledge of illegality. 
See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 614-16 (1971); see also supra note 46 and accom-
panying text. 
16] Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434. 
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D. Environmental Crimes Since Liparota: No Emergence of a 
Uniform Culpability Analysis 
75 
The extent to which knowledge of regulations should be required 
was addressed a year later in United States v. Hayes International 
Corp., a 1986 decision by the 11th Circuit. 162 In Hayes, the court 
determined the culpability prescribed by Section 6928(d)(1) of 
RCRA.163 This provision regulated the transportation of hazardous 
waste as opposed to the treatment, storage, or disposal regulated 
by the provision at issue in Johnson & Towers. 164 
Like the provision in Johnson & Towers, Section 6928(d)(1) did 
not make clear whether the "knowingly" requirement modified some 
or all of the elements of the offense. 165 According to the court, 
Congress intentionally left the definition and application of "know-
ing" to the courts to resolve pursuant to general principles. The 
court sought to discover those general principles by considering the 
policy behind public welfare statutes, previous Supreme Court cases, 
congressional purpose, and the practical effect of particular culpa-
bility requirements, such as the effect on the prosecution's burden 
of proof. 166 
The Hayes court noted first that certain cases, such as the Su-
preme Court case of United States v. Freed,167 required no mental 
element for conviction. 168 In such cases, the lack of a culpability 
requirement was justified by the status of the regulation involved 
162 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). The lack of clarity in Liparota's distinction between 
"unauthorized" and "illegal" may have had an effect on the Hayes decision. The Hayes court 
interpreted Liparota as holding that "knowledge of illegality was necessary." I d. at 1503. The 
court apparently ignored signals given by the Liparota Court that only knowledge that conduct 
was unauthorized was required. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. As a result 
of this misinterpretation, the Hayes court may have decided that knowledge of illegality was 
the appropriate minimum for a non-public welfare statute such as the food stamp regulation 
in Liparota. If this interpretation is the one used by the Hayes court, culpability appropriate 
for a public welfare statute would range from strict liability to knowledge that one's conduct 
is unauthorized. Even if the Hayes court did not think in these terms, any case subsequent 
to Liparota might use such an analysis. 
163 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Section 6928(d)(1) imposes criminal penalties on 
"[aJny person who (1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste 
identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit .... " Id. 
164 The Johnson & Towers court interpreted RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2). See United 
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 
(1985). 
165 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503. 
166 See id. at 1502-04. 
167 401 U.S. 601 (1971). 
16' Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1502. 
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as a public welfare statute. 169 The statute in Hayes, like the one in 
Freed, qualified as a public welfare statute because it regulated 
dangerous materials yo A critical difference between the statute in 
Freed and Section 6928(d)(1), however, was that the statute in Freed 
contained no culpability requirement. 171 The existence of such a re-
quirement in Section 6928(d)(1) meant that the Hayes court had to 
balance the public welfare character of RCRA against RCRA's spe-
cific statutory language and the purposes behind Congress' use of 
such language. 172 
The Hayes court began the balancing process by noting that 
RCRA's culpability requirement was affected by the fact that RCRA 
was a public welfare statute. 173 The court explained that, because 
the public policy behind such a statute is so compelling, a court may 
presume that a defendant was aware of the regulations. 174 Prior to 
analyzing how "knowing" modified the elements of the offense, then, 
the court made a preliminary decision that, at the very least, defen-
dants could be presumed to be aware of RCRA's regulations. 175 
To analyze how the culpability element in Section 6928(d)(1) mod-
ified the elements of the offense, the Hayes court considered how 
far down the sentence "knowing" should travel. 176 The court ap-
proached the issue as a grammatical problem and did not actually 
break the offense down into its three elements: must the defendants 
know that (1) they were transporting a waste?; (2) the waste was 
hazardous?; and (3) the facility to which they were transporting 
waste did not have a permit?177 The court's analytical approach re-
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 1503. 
171 Freed, 401 U.S. at 607. 
172 See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504. "The Court has had greater difficulty with statutes in which 
Congress has created an offense of 'knowingly violating a regulation.'" [d. at 1502. 
173 See id. at 1503. 
174 See id. at 1502. 
175 See id. at 1503. 
Awareness of the regulations is a corollary of the third element of the offense at issue in 
Hayes, that is, whether the facility had a permit. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. 
For example, a defendant would have to be familiar enough with RCRA to recognize a RCRA 
permit or to know enough to inquire as to its existence. 
176 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503. 
177 Section 6928(d)(1) criminalizes the knowing transportation of any hazardous waste to a 
facility without a permit. See supra note 163. 
The analytical approach chosen by the Hayes court is more similar to what Robinson and 
Grall have characterized as "offense analysis" than it is to "element analysis." See supra note 
37. The Hayes court used offense analysis when it did not break the offense down into its 
material elements and did not consider whether separate elements might have different 
CUlpability requirements. 
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quired a determination as to whether the "knowing" requirement 
applied to all words in Section 6928(d)(1) or only to one or some 
words immediately following the word "knowing. "17S 
To determine how far along the sentence "knowing" traveled, the 
Hayes court first looked to the congressional purpose of the partic-
ular provisions involved. ml By enacting Section 6928(d)(1), Congress 
hoped to prevent the transportation of hazardous waste to unlicensed 
facilities. The court believed that eliminating the "knowing" require-
ment would criminalize conduct that Congress had not intended to 
penalize. ISO 
The Hayes court then considered the prosecutorial burden of re-
quiring proof that the defendants knew that the disposal facility did 
not have a permit, in addition to proof that defendants knew that 
they were transporting hazardous waste. The court decided that the 
burden was reasonable relative to the need to prevent criminalizing 
innocent conduct. lSI As the court pointed out, the prosecution need 
only show the defendants' knowledge of the facility's permit status, 
not that the defendants knew that the law required a permit. 182 
Proof of knowledge of the permit status could be satisfied, moreover, 
by proof that the defendants knew that they had not inquired about 
the permit status. 1S3 Consequently, the Hayes court held that the 
"knowing" requirement modified all elements of the offense, requir-
178 See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503. 
179 Id. at 1504. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. 
182 Id. at 1504 n.6. 
To clarify its discussion about how far "knowingly" should travel, the Hayes court used a 
hypothetical from Liparota. Id. at 1503 n.5. For the text of the hypothetical, see supra note 
85. What the Hayes court did would be similar to requiring sellers to know that they did not 
have a permit to sell securities but not that a permit was required. 
183 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504 n.6. It is hard to imagine transporters being unaware of whether 
they had made the physical effort to ascertain a facility's permit status. Cf, United States v. 
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
"[Plrosecution of regular shippers for violations of the regulations could hardly be impeded 
by the 'knowingly' requirement for triers of fact would have no difficulty whatever in inferring 
knowledge on the part of those whose business it is to know, despite their protestations to the 
contrary." Id. (citing United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 
569 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)). The exception would be transporters 
who thought somehow that they had inquired when they actually had not. In other words, 
except for those few who honestly believed they had inquired when they had not, this language 
criminalizes all transporters who do not check permit status. See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504 n.6. 
Of course, if they had checked, discovered no permit existed, and disposed at the facility 
anyway, they would also be liable. Despite the "knowing" language, then, the court seems to 
be imposing a presumption of knowledge by creating a duty to inquire. 
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ing the prosecution to prove that the defendants knew they were 
transporting a hazardous waste to a facility without a permit. 
The holding in Hayes was more consistent with the International 
Minerals decision in that it presumed knowledge of the regula-
tions. 184 Unlike the International Minerals Court, however, the 
Hayes court counted as one of the material elements knowledge of 
a fact that included a legal element, that is, knowledge that the 
facility did not have a permit. 185 Unlike the Johnson & Towers court, 
the Hayes court did not explicitly consider knowledge that a permit 
was required to be an element of the offense nor did it require proof 
of such knowledge. 186 
In requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendants knew 
they were transporting a hazardous waste to a facility without a 
permit, the Hayes court joined what appears to be a trend of re-
quiring knowledge of facts containing legal elements. For example, 
both the Hayes and Johnson & Towers courts required proof that 
the defendants knew that a facility had no permit. 187 Moreover, 
Brennan's distinction between "legal elements" and "consciousness 
of wrongdoing" in his Freed concurrence gained support from a 
majority of the Court by the time Liparota was decided. l88 Thus, 
the courts seem to be overlooking the Model Penal Code's comment 
that a legal element should not be a part of the law defining the 
offense. 189 Instead, the courts allow the legal element to be a pro-
vision from the same statute as the criminal penalty provisions as 
long as it is not part of the penal clause itself.190 As a result, courts 
have been applying culpability requirements to material elements 
regardless of the source of a legal element. 
Nevertheless, no court has suggested that the principle that ig-
norance of the law is no defense should be abandoned altogether. 
Liparota has gone as far as allowing a defense of ignorance that 
conduct was unauthorized. 191 But even the Liparota Court was care-
184 See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503. 
185 See id. at 1505. In contrast, the International Minerals Court did not consider as a 
material element knowledge that the shipping papers weren't proper. 
186Id. at 1503. The court merely charged defendants with knowledge of the regulatory 
provisions and determined that it would not be a defense to argue ignorance of those provi-
sions.Id. 
187 See id. at 1505; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669. 
188 See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985) (citing United States v. 
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
189 M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 11, at 131. 
190 See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 936. 
191 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9. 
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ful not to create a defense of ignorance of illegality.192 At the very 
least, then, it appears that courts agree that the principle is appli-
cable with respect to knowledge of illegality. Thus, a court would 
not likely interpret a culpability requirement as modifying an ele-
ment of an offense if such an interpretation resulted in requiring 
proof that defendants knew their conduct was illegal. Where the 
courts are less predictable, then, lies in the area between knowledge 
of illegality and knowledge of a fact with a legal element. Because 
of this unpredictability, and because the courts have failed to develop 
a consistent approach to determining culpability, the analytical 
guidelines suggested by this Comment will assist courts in respond-
ing to the increasing volume of environmental criminal cases. 
III. AN ANALYTICAL ApPROACH TO DETERMINE THE 
CULPABILITY PRESCRIBED BY ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
STATUTES 
A variety of overlapping terms and inconsistent interpretations 
has rendered chaotic most distinctions between different kinds of 
culpability. 193 Courts interpreting culpability requirements have only 
added to the confusion. 194 This Comment will propose an analytical 
approach to provide greater uniformity in determining culpability 
requirements. 195 By requiring a series of analytical steps, this ap-
proach will ensure that courts treat culpability analysis more thor-
oughly. In addition, using element analysis will encourage clarity 
and precision, thereby increasing fairness of penalties as well as 
reducing litigation; will provide greater due process protection for 
defendants by ensuring more complete notice of criminal provisions 
and reducing opportunities for arbitrary enforcement; and will tailor 
penalties more precisely to fit the crimes committed, thus allowing 
192Id. 
193 See LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 3.4(a)-(c). 
194 See R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 744, 771. Compare United States v. International 
Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (where dangerous or deleterious materials 
are involved, knowledge of the regulations may be presumed) with United States v. Elshen-
awy, 801 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1986) (where the probability of regulation is great, knowledge 
may be presumed) and United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (knowledge of regulations may not be presumed). 
195 This Comment focuses on regulatory statutes with knowing requirements rather than 
statutes with other types of culpability requirements or no culpability requirement at all. This 
Comment focuses on public welfare statutes in particular because most environmental statutes 
fall into both categories. See supra note 53 and accom,1anying text. 
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courts to feel more comfortable imposing stiffer penalties when nec-
essary.196 
The approach is composed of a series of analytical steps. First, a 
court should examine the specific language of the statute in order to 
determine whether the state of mind required for a criminal penalty, 
if any, may be read literally. Next, a court must determine how this 
culpability requirement should be applied. The court must first break 
the offense down into its material elements, one of which will be a 
culpability element unless the statute imposes strict liability. The 
court should then consider a number of factors in determining the 
culpability required for each element of the offense. 
The first factor to consider is whether the statute is a public 
welfare statute. If it is not a public welfare statute, the culpability 
element generally should modify all the elements of the offense. If 
it is a public welfare statute, the court should then factor in the 
legislative history underlying the statute's criminal provisions and, 
if necessary, the entire statute as well. As a third and final step in 
considering factors affecting culpability, a court should determine 
whether it has created some form of an ignorance of the law defense. 
If it has created such a defense, it should consider eliminating the 
defense by reducing the number of elements that the culpability 
element must modify. 
A. The Specific Language of the Statute's Criminal Penalty 
Provisions 
A court must first look at the specific language of the statute's 
relevant criminal provisions. 197 Assuming the statute prescribes a 
196 Arbitrary methods for interpreting culpability are particularly damaging to effective and 
meaningful enforcement of environmental statutes. Absent egregious conduct motivated by 
the most evil of intentions, judges are likely to feel uncomfortable handing out criminal 
penalties of much weight. Though the number of statutes creating strict liability crimes has 
grown, "the infliction of criminal punishment upon the unaware has long troubled the fair 
administration of justice." United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971); see also Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1241. 
Moreover, the typical defendant in an environmental criminal proceeding is a businessper-
son, respected in the community as successful and upstanding. See Starr, supra note 1, at 
383; Wrenn, supra note 1, at 1028. Courts have more difficulty imposing jail sentences on 
such individuals. Starr, supra note 1, at 383. Courts have especial difficulty because the 
forbidden behavior "may come very close to what is seen as good corporate practice in the 
competitive business world." Developments in the Law, supra note 12, at 1235. Finally, the 
nature of pollution also makes judges hesitant about imposing criminal penalties. Starr, supra 
note 1, at 383. Because the actual harm may not surface for years, and because the seriousness 
of the harm is often in itf· incremental contribution to environmental pollution, the damage 
caused by a violation may not appear to warrant a criminal penalty. Id. 
197 N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.01, at 1-3 (Sands 4th ed. 
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culpability element, a court must decide whether to interpret the 
culpability element literally.198 If the language is plain and can lead 
to only one interpretation, a court should use that interpretation. 199 
A court should ignore the plain meaning of a statute only in order 
to avoid a harsh or foolish result. 200 
Given the historic confusion surrounding interpretation of the 
word "knowing," however, the language of the culpability element 
in an environmental protection statute is almost always likely to be 
ambiguous. Even if a literal reading of the culpability element ap-
peared to have an unmistakably plain meaning, "knowing" has been 
used in too many different ways to make such a reading appropriate. 
Rather, the ambiguity inherent in the usage of "knowing" requires, 
as do statutes that lead to a harsh or foolish result, consideration of 
the language and design of the statute as a whole. 
A court may also ignore the plain meaning of a statute when 
interpreting a regulatory crime and when the apparent plain mean-
ing of that regulatory statute does not effectuate the regulatory 
purpose.201 Unlike crimes originating in common law, regulatory 
crimes should not necessarily be contrued strictly.202 Thus, if the 
language of the culpability element is ambiguous, if the plain mean-
ing would lead to a harsh or foolish result, or if the statute is a 
1984); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 10-11 (1975); 
see K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988) (citing Bethesda Hospital Ass'n 
v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255 (1988); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220-21 
(1986»; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665 (in any statutory analysis, a court is obliged first 
to look to the language); see also M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3 (comments first discuss 
definitions of culpability elements and only later how culpability elements should be applied 
to the remaining material elements). 
198 If the statute prescribes no culpability element, a court must decide if the absence of a 
culpability element should be interpreted literally, thus imposing strict liability. LAFAVE 
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 3.8(a). Strict liability would not be appropriate if the crime 
originated from common law. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
437 (1978); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302,310 (8th Cir. 1960); see also Wasserstrom, 
Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 735 (1960). In such a case, a 
court would probably infer a culpability requirement for all material elements of the offense. 
Strict liability may also be inappropriate depending on the severity of the penalty or the notice 
provided by the nature of the prohibited conduct. LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, 
§ 3.8(a), at 244-45. 
199 LAFAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 10, at 69; LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 
3, § 2.2(b). 
200 LAFAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 10, at 69. 
201 See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
202Id. (citing United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672-73 (1975); Smith v. California, 361 
U.S. 147, 152 (1959); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81, 284-85 (1943); 
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1922); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 
F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)). 
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regulatory statute, a court should consider the particular statutory 
language as well as the language and design of the statute as a 
whole. 
Consideration of the language and design of the statute as a whole 
requires balancing the specific language of the culpability element 
against the need to effectuate the statute's regulatory purpose. 203 In 
determining regulatory purpose, courts often apply a number of 
statutory interpretation rules and principles. 204 These rules and prin-
ciples usually narrow the scope of the statute out of concern that 
statutes give fair warning of what constitutes criminal conduct. 205 
The principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse is thus an 
exception because it expands the area of conduct qualifying for crim-
inal penalties. 
For example, in International Minerals the Court chose to inter-
pret "knowingly violates any such regulation" as simply requiring 
knowledge of certain elements of the offense. 206 The Court refused 
to read the culpability element as requiring that defendants know 
that their conduct violated the law because such a reading would 
conflict with the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense. 207 
Because Congress had not clearly endorsed an ignorance of the law 
defense, the Court chose to ignore the literal interpretation of 
"knowingly violates" in order to effectuate what it perceived as the 
purpose of the statute. 208 
203 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666; LAFAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 10, at 
69. 
204 LAF AVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 10, at 69. 
205 Id. 
206 United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971). The 
dissent in International Minerals did not agree with such a balancing of policy and language, 
arguing instead that the language should be read literally. See id. at 566 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). The dissent believed that such factors should be balanced by Congress rather 
than by the courts. See id. at 565, 568. 
207Id. at 563. Congress has sometimes defined a crime to require knowledge that conduct 
was illegal. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 615 n.6 (1971). 
208 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563. Even if a court determines that a literal 
interpretation of the statutory language is appropriate, the precise definition of the culpability 
element may still pose problems. LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 3.5(b) (failure to 
distinguish between intent and knowledge). Although the Model Penal Code has attempted 
to impose uniformity on the definitions of different kinds of culpability, courts and legislatures 
have not treated culpability elements with the same consistency. See supra notes 193-94 and 
accompanying text; Robinson & Grall, supra note 3, at 705-06. 
For example, the legislative history of RCRA's criminal provisions suggests that different 
subsections might involve different meanings of the word "knowing." The definition of "know-
ing" under subsection 3008(d) was left to the courts to define using "general principles." See 
S. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-39, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. 
NEWS 5019, 5037-38 [hereinafter SENATE RCRA REPORT]. The definition of "knowing" under 
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Although a court may ignore a literal interpretation for the sake 
of carrying out a statute's purpose, a court may not ignore the 
statutory language altogether. 209 Out of deference to Congress, a 
court may not determine the requisite culpability without factoring 
in the culpability language used by Congress. Thus, a court may 
need to compromise maximum potential protection of public health 
and safety in the face of language requiring that criminal conduct be 
"knowing."21o In International Minerals, for example, the Court 
could have achieved the maximum protection possible from violations 
of corrosive liquid regulations by imposing strict liability.211 Given 
the "knowingly violates" language of the statute, however, the Court 
was limited to imposing some culpability requirement. 212 Most en-
vironmental statute criminal provisions will require a similar bal-
ancing of the statutory language and the statute's regulatory pur-
pose. 
B. Modification of the Material Elements of the Offense by the 
Culpability Element 
Whether a culpability element is interpreted literally or not, a 
court must determine how many of the material elements of the 
subsection 3008(e), however, was specifically laid out by Congress. Id. As explained in the 
conference report, "[tJhe basic definition for subsection (e) is that a person's state of mind is 
'knowing' with respect to (A) his conduct, if he is aware or believes that the circumstance 
exists, or (C) a result of his conduct if he is aware or believes that his conduct is substantially 
certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily injury." Id. . 
Because the Model Penal Code definitions of types of culpability have not been adopted or 
used uniformly, there may be an intermediate step in the analytical process in which a court 
chooses which definition of "knowing" to employ. Given the policy concerns behind environ-
mental statutes, a court interpreting an environmental statute that prohibits "knowing" 
conduct will probably define "knowing" as simply awareness of conduct and of facts related to 
the conduct, as in the Model Penal Code. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 
F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (knowledge does not require certainty); United States v. 
Corbin Farm Service, 444 F. Supp. 510, 519 (E.D. Cal.), afl'd, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(only knowledge of the actions constituting the violation is required). 
""" N. SINGER, supra note 197, § 45.01, at 1-3; R. DICKERSON, supra note 197, at 10-11. 
210 Absent a "knowing" requirement in a statute, a court could read the statute as imposing 
strict liability, thus achieving maximum health and safety protection. See LAFAVE CRIMINAL 
LAW, supra note 3, § 3.8(a). But, if the statute includes a "knowing" requirement, a court 
may not impose strict liability because to do so would ignore the expressed intent of Congress. 
See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1811, 1817 (1988). 
211 See LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 3.8, at 242-43 (may be difficult to get 
convictions unless the culpability element is omitted). 
"" International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560 (knowledge of the shipment of dangerous ma-
terials is required). As a result, "[aJ person thinking in good faith that he was shipping distilled 
water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would not be covered." Id. at 563-
64. 
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offense are modified by the culpability element. m For example, if a 
statute punishes any person who knowingly transports any hazard-
ous waste to a facility that does not have a permit, what must 
defendants know to be convicted? Must violators know (1) that they 
are transporting a material to a facility; (2) that the material is a 
hazardous waste; (3) that the facility does not have a permit; (4) that 
the facility is required to have a permit; (5) that regulations require 
a permit; and (6) that transporting to a facility without a permit is 
unauthorized or illegal? Or must defendants know only some of these 
elements? 
1. Breakdown of the Offense into its Material Elements 
To decide how many of the material elements are modified by the 
culpability element, a court must first determine what material ele-
ments constitute the offense at issue. 214 The material elements must 
be separated because culpability may vary as to each element. 215 
The question of the culpability required for conviction must therefore 
be faced separately with respect to each material element of the 
offense. 216 
2. Determination of Which Elements are Modified by the 
Culpability Element 
Once a court has divided the offense into its separate elements, it 
must decide to which of these elements the culpability requirement 
applies. Legislation does not often provide a clear answer.217 In the 
21:3 See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985). This determination has been referred 
to as deciding how far down the sentence (describing the offense) the culpability element 
"travels." See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499,1503 (11th Cir. 1986); 
Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424 n.7 (citing LAFAVE HANDBOOK, supra note 60, § 27, at 193). 
214 This Comment employs element analysis as opposed to offense analysis. See supra note 
37. 
215 See Freed, 401 U.S. at 613 (Brennan, J., concurring) (each material element of the offense 
must be examined). 
216 M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 1, at 124; LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra 
note 3, § 3.4(d). 
217 M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 6, at 129. "[A] common ambiguity in penal 
legislation [results from] the statement of a particular culpability requirement in the definition 
of an offense in such a way that it is unclear whether the requirement applies to all the 
elements of the offense or only to the element that it immediately .introduces." [d. Congress 
does not often make such intent clear, sometimes purposely, other times through inadvertence 
or use of shorthand designations. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 
1502 (11th Cir. 1986) (Congress left the definition of "knowing" to the courts to resolve under 
general principles); United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 
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exceptional statute where Congress has articulated precisely how 
the culpability element should be applied, a court should defer to 
congressional intent. 218 
In the majority of cases, however, courts will need to look at a 
variety of factors to determine the application of the culpability 
requirement that Congress intended. 219 The most important of these 
factors include the seriousness of harm to the public posed by vio-
lations of the statute, the legislative history of the statute, and the 
balance between providing fair warning but not allowing ignorance 
of the law to be a defense. 
a. Public Welfare Offenses 
Assuming the application of the culpability requirement is not 
clear from the statutory language, the first factor a court should use 
for guidance is whether the statute is a public welfare statute. A 
public welfare statute is currently one in which "Congress has ren-
dered criminal a type of conduct that [1] a reasonable person should 
know is subject to stringent public regulation and [2] may seriously 
threaten the community's health or safety."22o If the statute does not 
meet this two tier test,221 or if it is a statute that originates from 
common law,222 the culpability requirement should modify all ele-
ments of the offense. 223 
562 (1971) ("regulations" should be construed as a shorthand designation for conduct that 
violates the act); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 (1985) (legislative history 
contains nothing that would clarify the congressional purpose). 
21' LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, § 2.2(b) (plain meaning rule); M.P.C. COMMENTS, 
supra note 3, comment 6 (if a particular kind of culpability has been articulated by Congress, 
a court is required to use that construction); see Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424 ("The definition of 
the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of 
federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute. "). 
219 The analysis used by the Johnson & Towers court provides a good example of the variety 
of factors used to determine the application of the culpability element. See supra notes 126-
29 and accompanying text. 
220 Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
221 For example, the statute may be a non-public welfare statute, such as a statute regulating 
food stamps. Id. 
222 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); Holdridge 
v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 262-65 (1951). 
22:1 See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1971) 
(certain products may require intent as to every element). 
The Model Penal Code employs a similar approach: 
(4) Prescribed Culpability Requirement Applies to All Material Elements. When the 
law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 
commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements 
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If the statute is a public welfare statute, the court has discretion 
to apply the culpability requirement to all or just some elements of 
the offense. 224 In exercising this discretion, the court must be guided 
by what Congress intended. 225 The courts have turned to legislative 
history for such guidance. 
b. Legislative History of the Criminal Provisions 
In determining how far the culpability element travels in the 
criminal provisions of a public welfare offense, courts should look 
first for guidance in the legislative history of those provisions. 226 
Unfortunately, the criminal penalty provisions of environmental pro-
tection statutes are often not accompanied by sufficient legislative 
history to determine the culpability requirement that Congress in-
tended. 227 For example, the 1980 amendments of RCRA contain an 
thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless 
a contrary purpose plainly appears. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
It can be argued that a public welfare statute provides a "contrary purpose." Using this 
analysis, the culpability element would not have to be applied to all material elements of such 
a statute. 
224 Courts analyzing the culpability prescribed by public welfare statutes have had to decide 
how many elements of the offense the culpability requirement modified. See, e.g., United 
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1208 (1985); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (11th Cir. 1986). 
225 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424; Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665. 
Determination that a statute is a public welfare statute gives a court tremendous discretion. 
In fact, a court may go so far as only requiring proof that defendants knew they were physically 
handling a dangerous material. See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 
402 U.S. 558, 560, 565 (1971). When interpreting the culpability requirement of a statute, 
courts have emphasized the extent of this discretionary power and have then analyzed all the 
factors that mayor may not counsel against exercising those powers to their fullest. For 
example, the Johnson & Towers court noted that the public welfare character of RCRA would 
permit reading the statute without any "mens rea requirement" but that other factors coun-
seled against going so far. See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668-69. 
226 While the legislative history of the statute as a whole may also be helpful, congressional 
intent with respect to the specific criminal provisions at issue would seem to provide the most 
precise guidance. For example, Congress described the culpability it intended to require in 
the legislative history specific to RCRA's reckless endangerment offense. See SENATE RCRA 
REPORT, supra note 208. 
2"7 Unlike the legislative history of RCRA's reckless endangerment offense, the legislative 
history specific to FIFRA's criminal provisions does not describe the culpability requirement 
intended by Congress. See SENATE FIFRA REPORT, supra note 104, at 4019. 
Until the 1980s, environmental criminal penalty provisions weren't controversial enough to 
attract significant congressional debate because the assumption was that criminal penalties 
would rarely be appropriate for environmental crimes. See id. (civil remedies appropriate 
means of enforcement as opposed to criminal sanctions). It is likely that the increased enforce-
ment effort by the Department of Justice will cause Congress to provide more legislative 
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unusually detailed description of the state of mind necessary for 
knowing endangerment violations pursuant to subsection 3008(e).228 
Despite the detail, the conference report does not make clear which 
material elements "knowingly" should modify.229 Because Congress 
rarely provides a step-by-step explanation of which elements should 
be modified by the culpability element, the precise application of the 
culpability element is usually left to the courts. Absent more specific 
instruction, courts must choose the interpretation that will effectuate 
the regulatory purpose of the statute by looking at the legislative 
history of the statute as a whole. 
c. Legislative History of the Entire Statute 
The policy concerns motivating the enactment of a piece of envi-
ronmentallegislation provide a powerful influence in a court's deter-
mination of the culpability requirement intended by Congress. 230 The 
need to effectuate the statute's purpose will affect how a court 
applies the culpability element regarding the modification of the 
elements of an offense by the culpability element. Thus, if requiring 
knowledge of all elements of an offense would make the government's 
burden so heavy that the statute became virtually unenforceable, a 
court should apply the culpability requirement to only. some of the 
elements. 
The effect of statutory purpose on a court's application of a culp-
ability requirement is most pronounced when a public welfare statute 
is involved. The policy behind public welfare statutes is so compelling 
that courts may, in effect, impose a broader scope of criminal liability 
than is expressly allowed by the legislative history.231 The pre sump-
history behind criminal provisions. Until then, courts will usually have to depend on the 
legislative history of the entire statute for guidance in the application of a culpability element. 
228 See SENATE RCRA REPORT, supra note 208. 
229 For example, when the report explains that the defendant must have "knowingly engaged 
in conduct which violates certain statutory prohibitions," it is not clear whether the defendant 
must know that the conduct violated the statute. See id. 
230 The statutory purpose plays an important role throughout this analytical approach. For 
example, the reason that courts even have discretion at this stage to look at legislative history 
is that the purposes behind public welfare statutes are so compelling. Were the purposes 
behind the statutes as a whole not so compelling, general principles of criminal law would 
require a culpability requirement for all elements of the offense. See supra notes 139-44 and 
accompanying text. 
2:H For example, the court in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. noted that the fact 
that RCRA was a public welfare statute would justify reading RCRA without any mens rea 
requirement. 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). The less 
culpability that is required, the broader the scope of a statute and the greater the number of 
persons qualifying for criminal penalties. 
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tion with public welfare statutes is that protection of public health 
and safety is of primary importance and that culpability must be 
determined in light of that protective purpose. 232 In contrast, when 
interpreting statutory crimes originating in common law or regula-
tory crimes that are not part of a public welfare statute, courts must 
presume a culpability requirement with respect to all elements of an 
offense. 233 In this latter case, regulatory purpose will only have an 
effect if it is compelling enough to rebut the presumption that proof 
of culpability is required. 234 
Courts looking for congressional purpose in a statute's legislative 
history have focused on the history's articulation of the conduct 
intended to be regulated, the seriousness and extent of that conduct, 
and the actors Congress targeted for punishment. 235 Courts may also 
consider guidance provided by other statutes, the severity of the 
punishment provided, the defendant's opportunity to ascertain facts 
that would affect a decision to engage in the forbidden conduct, the 
difficulty imposed on the prosecution by requiring proof of a certain 
mental state, and the number of prosecutions expected. 236 
For example, the Hayes court considered all of these factors before 
deciding to apply the "knowing" requirement to all elements of the 
RCRA offense before it. 237 The court noted that Congress had cre-
ated a cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme,238 involving a heavily reg-
ulated area with great ramifications for public health and safety. 239 
The court also recognized that the statute was intended to prevent 
transportation of hazardous waste to unlicensed facilities. 240 Al-
though these factors would justify reading RCRA to make conviction 
2:12 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 666 (criminal penalties of public health regulatory 
statutes "are to be construed to effectuate the regulatory purpose"); Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1951). For example, the court in United States v. Hayes Int'I 
Corp. determined the culpability required regarding regulatory provisions in light of the fact 
that RCRA was a public welfare statute. See 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (lIth Cir. 1986). 
2;1:l See supra notes 139-44, 222-23 and accompanying text. 
2:14 See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 616 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (pre-
sumption of mens rea rebutted by dangerousness of weapons regulated). The assumption is 
that the culpability element applies to all material elements unless a "contrary purpose plainly 
appears." M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 6; see Liparota v. United States, 471 
U.S. 419, 430 (1985) (policy behind statute not compelling enough to overcome knowledge 
requirement). 
""5 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1504. 
2:16 LAFAVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 3.8(a), at 244-45. 
287 See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1502-04. 
2.18 I d. at 1501. 
2;19Id. at 1501, 1503. 
240 I d. at 1504. 
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as easy as possible,241 the court decided to apply the "knowing" 
requirement to all elements of the offense because of the type of 
actor targeted by Congress. 242 The court decided that, without such 
a stringent culpability requirement, innocent conduct would be cri-
minalized contrary to congressional intent. 24:3 Thus, the statute's 
purpose affected how the court modified the material elements of 
the offense with the culpability element. 
d. Ignorance of the Law Defense 
As a final consideration in the determination of which elements 
are modified by the culpability element, a court should decide 
whether requiring knowledge of a particular material element will 
create a defense of ignorance of the law. 244 Courts go to great lengths 
to avoid permitting such a defense out of respect for the familiar 
principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 245 While in most 
cases knowledge of the law should not be an issue, however, there 
are cases in which not allowing ignorance of the law to be a defense 
would violate due process. 246 A court will thus have to balance the 
need to avoid creating such a defense against the need to avoid 
criminalizing innocent conduct. 247 
To perform this balancing act, a court should consider whether 
not allowing the defense might encourage arbitrary enforcement, 
whether the defendant would or could have had notice of the law, 
241 The fewer material elements of an offense modified by a culpability requirement, the 
easier it is to convict. 
242 Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1505. 
24:1 I d. at 1504. 
244 In a case such as International Minerals, where reading the language of the offense 
literally would create a defense of ignorance of the law, this step will be the second time a 
court addresses the issue. The first time a court considers the issue will be regarding the 
interpretation of the culpability element. The second time will be regarding the number of 
elements of the offense that the culpability element should modify. 
24' See United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971); 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985). 
246 Note, supra note 44, at 1412-13. 
24. The fear of criminalizing innocent conduct is articulated in Justice Stewart's dissent in 
International Minerals: 
The only real impact of this decision will be upon the casual shipper, who might be 
any man, woman, or child in the Nation. A person who had never heard of the 
regulation might make a single shipment of an article covered by it in the course of 
a lifetime .... Yet today's decision holds that a person who does just that is guilty 
of a criminal offense punishable by a year in prison. This seems to me a perversion 
of the purpose of criminal law. 
402 U.S. at 569 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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and whether ignorance of the law is itself blameworthy.248 When 
conduct is ordinary and unremarkable, a court could consider allow-
ing ignorance of the law to be a defense. 249 When conduct poses a 
threat to public health and welfare, however, and is thus serious 
enough to be prohibited by a public welfare statute, a court should 
not allow the defense. 250 
These factors in the balancing process already playa part in courts' 
approaches to the ignorance of the law defense. 251 Rather than ar-
ticulate this process, though, courts have responded instead by using 
different meanings of the words "the law" to justify their decisions 
as to whether a material element should be modified by the culpa-
bility requirement. 252 By arguing that a material element does not 
involve "the law," a court can require knowledge of that element 
while holding that it has not created an ignorance of the law de-
fense. 253 Thus, Brennan, in both Freed and Liparota, argued that 
certain elements were only "legal elements," the ignorance of which 
could properly constitute a defense. Similarly, the Court in Inter-
national Minerals pointed out that ignorance of "facts," as opposed 
to ignorance of "the law," could be a proper defense. 
Environmental criminal provisions, in particular, illustrate the 
difficulty of deciding what "the law" means as used in the principle 
that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Environmental statutes often 
regulate undesirable activity by using a permit system. 254 Permits 
are issued only when conduct meets the standards promulgated by 
the statute. The existence of the permit is a physical fact that may 
be ascertained in the same way that shippers determine the fact that 
they are shipping hazardous waste. 255 The critical difference between 
248 Note, supra note 44, at 1413. 
249 Id. at 1410-13; Greenspun, supra note 97, at 307-08. 
250 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-65; Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
251 See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 441 (rule of lenity ensures that criminal statutes provide 
fair warning); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(removing knowing requirement would criminalize innocent conduct). 
252 Compare Liparota, 471 U.S. 419 (ignorance of the law is not a defense when knowledge 
of "the law" means knowledge of illegality) with International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558 (igno-
rance of the law is not a defense when knowledge of "the law" means knowledge of anything 
with a legal element). See also Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503 (interpretation of Liparota suggested 
that court was equating knowledge of "illegality" with knowledge of a fact with a "legal 
element"). 
Perhaps these courts chose to mire themselves in vocabulary rather than admit to the fact 
that they were engaged in balancing because they were afraid of appearing arbitrary. See 
Note, supra note 44, at 1413. 
253 See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.9. 
254 See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
255 Determining the type of material that one is transporting may require some amount of 
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these two facts is that a permit is a fact brought into existence by 
operation of law. A permit exists only because a law has created it. 
Knowledge of the law, therefore, may be an integral part of knowl-
edge of a fact. 
The knowledge of the law necessary for a person to know that a 
facility has a permit is not the same as knowledge that one's own 
behavior is regulated by law or that one's conduct is illegal. Thus, a 
transporter of hazardous waste may know that a particular facility 
does not have a permit but may not know that "the law" regulates 
the transport of waste to such a facility. Even if the transporter 
knows that taking waste to a facility is regulated by statute, the 
transporter may not know that "the law" makes such transportation 
illegal. As the permit example illustrates, knowledge of "the law" 
may mean anything from recognition of an item created by law to 
awareness of regulations to knowledge that conduct is illegal. Con-
sequently, the distinction in International Minerals between igno-
rance of facts and ignorance of the law is, on a practical level, 
meaningless. 
The distinction in Freed and Liparota is equally meaningless. Most 
importantly, there is no agreement on what is the proper source of 
a legal element. The Model Penal Code states that the law involved 
in a "legal element" cannot be the law defining the offense but must 
be part of some other legal rule. 256 For example, theft requires 
knowledge that property belongs to someone else. Knowledge of 
property law in such a case is a legal element of a theft offense but 
is not part of the law defining and prohibiting theft. 257 
inquiry. It is possible that someone might believe, in good faith, that he or she is transporting 
distilled water rather than dangerous acid. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 
F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). In contrast, the physical act 
of transporting something would almost always be knowing "since it is not likely that one 
would treat, store or dispose of waste without knowledge of that action." Id. 
256 See M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, comment 11, at 131. The section cited by Brennan 
to illustrate his point reads: 
It should be noted that the general principle that ignorance or mistake of law is 
no excuse is usually greatly overstated; it has no application when the circumstances 
made material by the definition of the offense include a legal element. So, for example, 
it is immaterial in theft, when claim of right is adduced in defense, that the claim 
involves a legal judgment as to the right of property. It is a defense because knowl-
edge that the property belongs to someone else is a material element of the crime 
and such knowledge may involve matter of law as well as fact. ... The law involved 
is not the law defining the offense; it is some other legal rule that characterizes the 
attendant circumstances that are material to the offense. 
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 615 (1971) (citing M.P.C. COMMENTS, supra note 3, 
comment 11, at 131). 
257 M.P.C. COMMENTS, s1ipra note 3, comment 11, at 131. 
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In contrast, the Liparota Court allowed the legal element to be 
part of the same statute allegedly violated. The Court held that it 
was a defense to the federal food stamp fraud statute that one did 
not know that one's conduct was unauthorized by that statute. 258 
The Court justified permitting such a defense by labeling as only a 
legal element knowledge that the use, transfer, or acquisition of food 
stamps was in a manner unauthorized by statute. 259 Because knowl-
edge that conduct was unauthorized constituted only a legal element, 
ignorance that conduct was unauthorized could be a proper defense. 
Environmental statutes complicate the debate over whether ig-
norance of a legal element may be a defense if that legal element is 
part of the statute defining the offense. For example, RCRA pro-
vides criminal penalties for "[a]ny person who (1) knowingly trans-
ports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or 
listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit 
under this subchapter . . . . "260 This definition of a crime includes 
the legal element of whether a facility physically has a permit pur-
suant to, for example, section 6925 of RCRA.261 Section 6925, re-
quiring facilities to have permits, is part of the same sUbchapter of 
RCRA as the section defining the crime. 262 Certainly RCRA defines 
the criminal offense as well as the conditions attached to the issuance 
of a permit.263 As a result, the Model Penal Code would not allow 
ignorance of whether a facility had a proper RCRA permit to be a 
defense whereas the Liparota Court would. 264 
The inability to articulate any realistic distinctions between "the 
law" and "legal elements," or "the law" and "facts," makes the 
2" Liparuta, 471 u.s. at 425. 
259 [d. at 425 n.9. 
2GO 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985). 
261 [d. § 6925 (permits for treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste). 
2G242 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) and § 6925 are both part of the subchapter entitled "Hazardous 
Waste Management." [d. §§ 6924-6939. 
2G3 See id. §§ 6928, 6925. 
264 Perkins suggests that both the legal element and the provision describing the offense 
may be part of the same law as long as the legal element is not part of the penal clause. See 
R. PERKINS, supra note 3, at 935-36. If 
[d. 
an exception is claimed solely on the absence of a required specific intent or other 
special mental element because of ignorance or mistake of law, the error must relate 
to some law other than that under which the prosecution itself is brought .... [Bloth 
provisions might appear in the same statute, but the want of knowledge which is 
admissible in evidence is limited to those clauses which determine who is entitled to 
vote and where [or who must get a permitl, and does not extend to the penal clause 
itself. 
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forthright use of the balancing process suggested in this Comment 
a more workable alternative. The balancing process is based on the 
recognition that the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense 
is more likely to make courts take time to justify their choice of a 
culpability requirement than affect a court's choice of which material 
elements a culpability requirement should modify. Public health and 
welfare concerns, as well as due process, would therefore be better 
protected if courts openly engaged in the balancing process rather 
than struggled to justify decisions with different definitions of "the 
law." 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Environmental statutes originate from a long history of public 
welfare statutes. Those public welfare statutes have changed over 
time to include environmental laws that impose criminal penalties 
and that prescribe culpability as an element of a criminal offense. 
The changes require incorporation of traditional criminal law theo-
ries originating in common law. The result is a class of hybrid stat-
utes whose culpability elements can only be determined by a series 
of flexible balancing tests. This balancing approach utilizes element 
analysis, requiring a determination of the culpability required for 
each separate element of an offense. Although this approach will not 
transform culpability analysis into a precise science, use of this 
approach will provide uniformity, a more thorough analysis, and 
criminal penalties more closely tailored to violations of environmen-
tal statutes. 
